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Weathering the Worst Storm: How Attorneys Might
Successfully Defend Their Reputation Against Attack
from the Bench
Abstract. Based on the author's personal experience with a judicial
referral to a professional responsibility authority, this Essay offers lawyers
a strategy to emerge from such an ordeal undisciplined. The essence of
the strategy, which can be applied to a bar authority referral from any
source, is to treat the process of defending oneself under such
circumstances as a negotiation with bar authority counsel. The benefits of
approaching such referrals as a negotiation and following the advice of
Robert Fisher and William Ury about the importance of preparation, active
listening, separating the people from the problem, and being hard on the
problem are examined.
Author. Giel Stein is a Senior Counsel and Special Assistant United
States Attorney with the United States Social Security Administration,
Office of General Counsel, concentrating in federal sector trial work. Mr.
Stein is also an appointed Hearing Board Member of the Illinois Attorney
Registration and Disciplinary Commission and an Adjunct Professor of
Law at Northwestern University Law School and the University of Illinois,
where he teaches trial advocacy and civil discovery. In addition, Mr. Stein
performs mediations for the Chicago Federal Executive Board and the
Center for Conflict Resolution. He is a graduate of the University of
Chicago (B.A./M.A.) and Northwestern University (J.D./Ph.D.).
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Someone once told me there are two kinds of lawyers: Those who have
been accused of misconduct and those who will be accused of misconduct.
While overly pessimistic, that expression holds a certain degree of truth.
Like it or not, if you are a practicing lawyer, you are at risk of being
referred to a bar authority for professional misconduct (a "referral").
"Even reputable, ethical attorneys can find themselves forced to deal with
such proceedings."' Referrals can be made by clients, fellow lawyers, and
judges.2 While a referral from any source can be harmful, a referral from a
judge can be particularly damaging. Such challenges to the character and
competence of the lawyer who is the subject of the referral (the
"respondent") are difficult to overcome, especially because of the high
regard in which judges are held.' And yet, despite their gravity, referrals
1. Kenneth M. Mogill, Tying an Attorny Discipline Case, 93 MICH. B.J. 44,44 (2014).
2. Since the passage of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, lawyers have been obligated
to report ethical misconduct by other lawyers under Rule 8.3. MODEL RULEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT
r. 8.3 (AM. BAR ASS'N 1983) ("A lawyer who knows that another lawyer has committed a violation of
the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the appropriate professional
authority."). This obligation dates back to DR1-103 of the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR1-103 (AM. BAR Ass'N 1980) ("A
lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge or evidence concerning another lawyer or judge shall
reveal fully such knowledge or evidence. . . ."). Judges have a similar duty under Rule 2.15 of the
Model Code of Judicial Conduct. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.15 (AM. BAR Ass'N
2010) ("A judge having knowledge that a lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question regarding the lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects shall inform the appropriate authority.").
3. See, e.g., ROBERT A. CARP ET AL., JUDICIAL PROCESS IN AMERICA 18 (10th ed. 2016) (1990)
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from judges are seldom, if ever, discussed. There is good reason for such
silence. It can be embarrassing and professionally injurious to publically
disclose that the propriety of one's professional conduct has been
questioned by anyone, let alone a judge.
Using my own experience with a state court judge as an example, this
Essay aims to break the silence and offer lawyers a strategy to successfully
deal with a judicial referral. The essence of the strategy is to treat the
process of defending oneself before a disciplinary authority as a
negotiation rather than an adversarial contest of wills. Defined as "the
ability to persuade someone to do something," negotiation is a powerful
tool.' By applying the renowned "principled negotiation"' advice of
Roger Fisher and William Ury concerning preparation, active listening,
separating the people from the problem, and being hard on the problem,
lawyers can increase their chance of emerging with a clean record from the
tribulation of defending themselves against a judicial referral.6
I. WHY NEGOTIATE?
Before delving into a discussion of how to apply Fisher and Ury's
negotiation advice to interactions with a bar authority prosecutor over a
judicial referral, it makes sense to first explain why such an approach might
be effective. After all, bar authority prosecutors are not mandated to
negotiate with respondents.' It is their job to "prosecute disciplinary
cases."8 So why might a bar authority prosecutor nevertheless respond
favorably to the negotiation style of a respondent who has been referred
by a judge? I mean, if ever there was an "open and shut case," this is
surely it, right? Maybe.
It is a fact of life that conflict at every level, although prevalent, rarely
erupts into actual struggle. Most labor disputes conclude without a strike,
most international quarrels are resolved short of war, and most litigation
("In general, judges are held in inordinately high esteem, and most Americans would be proud if a
son or daughter achieved this position.").
4. ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING To YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT
WITHOUT GIVING IN 182 (3d ed. 2011) (1981).
5. See id. at 11 (describing the method of principled negotiation as "a method of negotiation
explicitly designed to produce wise outcomes efficiently and amicably').
6. See id. at 11-12 (outlining the basic principles of the principled negotiation method).
7. See, e.g., ILCS S. CT. R. 752 (establishing the duties of the Administrator during an
investigation of a licensed attorney where no requirement for negotiation between the prosecutor and
respondent is stated).
8. Id. R. 752(b).
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settles before trial.' The struggle phase of conflict tends to so burden the
adversaries that it is usually avoided by a negotiated outcome that gives
each side approximately what it might have expected at the end of the
struggle.'0 The conflict spawned by a judicial referral need not be much
different. Assuming there are meritorious arguments to be made in the
respondent's defense, a judicial referral for professional misconduct can be
amenable to a negotiation approach by the respondent. The key to
understanding why is knowing the negotiation-theory concept of a "Best
Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement," or BATNA."
Adverse parties' estimations of their BATNA determine their desire to
negotiate. As Fisher and Ury put it, a party's BATNA is "the standard
against which any proposed agreement should be measured."1" In
considering whether to embrace or rebuff a proposed negotiated solution,
parties compare the perceived utility of a negotiated result against their
BATNA." To the extent that a negotiated outcome is more auspicious
than a party's BATNA, the party will likely be more inclined to
negotiate." To the extent that a negotiated outcome falls short of a
party's BATNA, that party will be inclined not to negotiate.1 5
In the case of a judicial referral, the respondent's BATNA is clear:
Avoid discipline by securing an adjudicated finding that no rules of
professional conduct were violated. The prosecutor's primary interest "is
not to punish the attorney, but rather to protect the public, maintain the
integrity of the legal profession, and protect the administration of justice
from reproach."'" The prosecutor's likely BATNA is to achieve this
objective by obtaining an adjudicated finding that the respondent should
9. Andrew Sher, FRCP 26 vs. FRE 498: Why Settlement Negotiations Should Be Privileged Against
Third-Pary Discovery, 16 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 295, 297 (2014) (citing Gillian K. Hadfield,
Where Have All the Trials Gone? Settlements, Nontrial Adjudicaions, and Statistical Artifacts in the Cbanging
Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 705, 706 (2004)) (noting the
conventional estimate that ninety-five percent of cases settle).
10. See Ellen A. Waldman, The Evaluative-Faditative Debate in Mediaion: Appying the Lns of
Therapeutic jurisprudence, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 155, 160 (1998) ("[Alternative dispute resolution methods]
represent a reaction to the psychological brutality of the adversary system. Repelled by the emotional
toll litigation exacts from participants, mediators eek to provide a less traumatic means of resolving
conflict.").
11. FISHER & URY, supra note 4, at 102.
12. Id.
13. See id. ("Instead of ruling out any solution that does not meet your bottom line, you can
compare a proposal with your BATNA to see whether it better satisfies your interests.").
14. See id. at 104-05 (expressing a party's willingness to settle a negotiation if they feel the
negotiated offer is better than their BATNA).
15. See id. (implying the party will take a negotiated offer if its BATNA is less powerful).
16. In re Winthrop, 848 N.E.2d 961, 981 (Ill. 2006).
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be disciplined for violating rules of professional conduct. If a negotiation
approach fails, both sides will spend a great deal of time, energy, and
resources pursuing their BATNAs with no guarantee of success.
By treating your defense before a professional responsibility authority as
a negotiation rather than an adversarial contest of wills, you might
diminish the attractiveness of the bar authority prosecutor's BATNA,
thereby increasing his receptiveness to your efforts to reach a mutually
satisfactory outcome." Even if bar authority prosecutors will not
formally negotiate with respondents, they are always attuned to the
strengths and weaknesses of both sides of the case. Following the
teachings of Fisher and Ury about preparation, active listening, separating
the people from the problem, and being hard on the problem can, as
discussed below, demonstrate to the bar authority prosecutor that you
pose no threat to the public, the integrity of the legal profession, or the
administration of justice. In other words, a well-executed negotiation
strategy can satisfy the bar authority prosecutor's primary interest and
obviate the need for any further formal proceedings. That is why it is
possible and worthwhile for respondents to approach their referral as they
would a negotiation, especially if they have been referred by judge.
II. BE PREPARED
If you hope to negotiate a positive outcome from a referral by a judge
for professional misconduct, you must be prepared. "Negotiation
power ... is not something of which you have a certain quantity that can
be applied anywhere for any purpose. It requires hard work in advance to
bring your resources to bear on being persuasive in a particular situation.
In other words, it requires preparation."" If you are like most
respondents, then facing a bar authority referral will be a novel (hopefully
once-in-a-lifetime) experience. Preparing for the challenge at hand should,
of course, begin with retaining counsel experienced in the area of
professional responsibility law." But do not rest all your weight on your
17. See FISHER & URY, supra note 4, at 103 ("Whether you should or should not agree on
something in a negotiation depends entirely upon the attractiveness to you of the best available
alternative."); see also Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Achieving Poleymaking Consensus: The (Unfortunate) Waning of
Negotiated Rulemaking, 49 S. TEX. L. REV. 987, 993-94 (2008) (acknowledging "where the participants
feel that they have a strong 'BATNA' . . . the chances of an agreement are reduced").
18. FISHER & URY, supra note 4, at 180; see also DONALD G. GIFFORD, LEGAL NEGOTIATION:
THEORY AND PRACTICE 1 (2d ed. 2007) (1989) ("[N]othing is more important to your success as a
negotiator than preparation . . . .").
19. 31 AM. JUR. Trials 633, § 1 (2016) (explaining the "greatest mistake" a lawyer accused of
misconduct can commit "is to attempt to defend against the charges as his own counsel. He is the
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lawyer. Using negotiation strategy to resolve a professional misconduct
referral is unconventional and may be an unfamiliar approach to many
veteran practitioners. So work alongside your lawyer and start by learning
the process in which you have become embroiled.
The administrative process for referrals is similar across the country.20
In Illinois, where my referral unfolded, referrals go to the Attorney
Registration and Disciplinary Commission (ARDC).2 ' The ARDC referral
process generally consists of five stages: Investigation, Inquiry Board,
Hearing Board, Review Board, and Illinois Supreme Court review.
During the Investigation stage, an ARDC prosecutor examines the referral
made against the respondent.2 ' The ARDC prosecutor may seek the
ARDC Administrator's permission to close the referral or to forward it to
the Inquiry Board for a determination of whether sufficient evidence exists
to charge the respondent with one or more professional conduct rule
violations before the Hearing Board." If the Inquiry Board approves the
filing of charges, as opposed to closing the matter, the ARDC prosecutor
will file a complaint with the Hearing Board." Hearing Board
determinations are based on discovery-including the discovery of
witnesses-motion practice, and an adversarial hearing.26 The hearings
themselves are formal trials conducted on the record, during which the
stereotypical person who, in Abraham Lincoln's words, has 'a fool for a client and an ass for a
lawyer." '.
20. See generall Debra Moss Curtis, Attorney Disiine Naionwide: A Comparative Ana ris ofProcess
and Staisics, 35 J. LEGAL PROF. 209 (2011) (detailing the procedure and statistics for the attorney-
discipline process across all fifty states).
21. See id. at 241 ("The Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission is charged with
regulating and disciplining attorneys for ethical violations of the Illinois Rules of Professional
Conduct."); ARDC Overview, AIT'Y REGISTRATION & DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION SUP. CT. ILL.,
https://www.iardc.org/overview.html (last visited May 8, 2016) (expressing one duty of the Attorney
Registration and Disciplinary Committee is to regulate the discipline of attorneys).
22. See ILCS ATr'Y REGISTRATION DISCIPLINARY COMM'N R. 51-55, 101-108, 201-291,
301-314 (identifying the rules that coincide and direct the investigations by the Administrator, the
Inquiry Board, and the Hearing Board); see also ARDC Oveniew, supra note 21 (summarizing the levels
of attorney disciplinary proceedings in the State of Illinois).
23. See ILCS ArrY REGISTRATION DISCIPLINARY COMM'N R. 51-55 (indicating the
prosecutor receives the charges and evidence before properly reviewing the allegations); see also
ARDC Oveniew, supra note 21 (noting the prosecutor and staff will investigate complaints on
attorneys).
24. See ILCS ATr'y REGISTRATION DISCIPLINARY COMM'N R. 54-55 (granting the prosecutor
the power to close the investigation if there is insufficient evidence of lawyer misconduct or to pass
the referral to the Inquiry Board for further action if the prosecutor finds sufficient evidence of
misconduct).
25. Id. R. 101-102, 211.
26. Id. R. 235, 251, 253, 260.
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ARDC prosecutor and respondent's counsel deliver opening statements,
offer evidence, direct and cross-examine witnesses, and make closing
arguments.27 Hearing Board determinations are appealable to the Review
Board.2 ' Review Board determinations are, with leave, appealable to the
Illinois Supreme Court.2
The respondent's odds of having the referral resolved without discipline
are greatest during the Investigation stage."o In this phase, the scope of
the conflict is confined between the ARDC prosecutor investigating the
referral and the respondent." The referring judge has already stated his or
her case. Now the prosecutor has two basic choices. The first option is to
escalate the judge's referral to the Inquiry Board because there is
"sufficient evidence to establish that the respondent engaged in
misconduct or the unauthorized practice of law or the Administrator
believes consideration by the Inquiry Board is warranted."" Alternatively,
the prosecutor can recommend the referral be closed out because "there is
insufficient evidence to establish that the respondent has engaged in
misconduct or to establish an allegation of unauthorized practice of
law."" Unencumbered by the views of an Inquiry Board or those of a
Hearing Panel (as neither body has weighed in yet), the ARDC
prosecutor's discretion over the fate of the referral is at its peak. * For
27. See ARDC OganiZaional Informadion, Arr'Y REGISTRATION & DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION
SUP. CT. ILL., https://www.iardc.org/overview.html (last visited May 8, 2016) ("Proceedings before
the Hearing Board ... are governed by the Illinois statutes and Supreme Court rules that govern civil
practice . . . .").
28. See ILL. COMP. STAT. ATT'Y REGISTRATION DISCIPLINARY COMM'N R. 284, 301-302, 304,
311 (proclaiming the ability of either party to appeal the determination of the Review Board).
29. See ILL. COMP. STAT. SUP. CT. R. 753(e) (asserting the Illinois Supreme Court reviews the
process of appeals from the Hearing Board); see also ILL. COMP. STAT. ATT'Y REGISTRATION
DISCIPLINARY COMM'N R. 415 (reiterating the review procedure for an appeal is the same as Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 753).
30. In 2014, the ARDC concluded 6,165 investigations. ATT'Y REGISTRATION &
DISCIPLINARY COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT OF 2014, at 16 (2014), https://www.iardc.org/
annualreport2014.pdf. ARDC prosecutors closed 5,901 (95.7%) investigations that year. Id. Of the
201 referrals that went to the Inquiry Board, 50 (24.8%) were closed after its review. Id. Of the 218
remaining referrals, 126 proceeded to the Hearing Board. Id. at 23. The Hearing Board closed 5
(3.9%) matters without imposing discipline. Id. at 26.
31. See ILL. COMP. STAT. ATT'Y REGISTRATION DISCIPLINARY COMM'N R. 54-55 (indicating
there are no parties involved in the investigation process besides the prosecutor and respondent).
32. Id. R. 55.
33. Id. R. 54.
34. 31 AM. JUR. Trials 633, § 24 (2016) ("The considerable powers of bar counsel should be
understood: he has the authority to file formal charges and set the case for hearing, or he may
dispose of it without further investigation. He may sit on a case indefinitely, or he can see that it is
thoroughly prosecuted.").
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the moment, only the prosecutor needs to be persuaded to close the
referral (with the Administrator's ultimate approval).
As a matter of common knowledge, as more people become involved in
a conflict, it will expand and become harder for any one participant to
persuade the others.3 5 Moreover, once things start to go south for a party,
it becomes progressively difficult to avoid an adverse final result.3 6 "What
is worse, once [a group has] painfully developed and agreed upon a
position, it becomes much harder to change it. Altering a position proves
equally difficult when additional participants are higher authorities who,
while absent from the table, must nevertheless give their approval.""
Thus, even if a respondent could turn the views of an initially reluctant bar
authority prosecutor around, it will be increasingly difficult for that
prosecutor to secure the referral's dismissal after it has moved deeper into
the process. The importance of demonstrating a referral does not merit
discipline during the earliest phase of its lifespan makes preparation all the
more vital.
In addition to learning the referral process, being prepared also means
that no matter how daunting it may be to face a referral from a judge:
"Don't be a victim."" Now that you know the early stage of the referral
process is the best time to get a referral resolved without discipline, act on
that knowledge. The bar authority will invite your response after it
receives the judge's referral." Once you have that invitation, there is no
time to waste.40 Begin preparing a comprehensive defense. Do not
assume that the judge's referral contains a fair and balanced presentation
of the controversy. While judges act as neutrals when they preside over
the court's docket, they are not the arbiter of their own professional
misconduct referral." Instead, their role as the referring party in such a
35. See MORTON DEUTSCH, THE RESOLUTION OF CONFUCT 351-52 (1973) (explaining, in
accordance with Gresham's Law of Conflict, as the scope of the conflict expands, there is an
increasing reliance on force coupled with a move away from persuasion, conciliation, and the
promulgation of mutual understanding and good will).
36. See id at 352 ("These processes [of escalation] give rise to a mutually reinforcing cycle of
relations that generate actions and reactions that intensify conflict.").
37. FISHER & URY, supra note 4, at 8.
38. Id. at 144; see also 31 AM. JUR. Trials 633, § 1 (2016) (observing a disciplinary proceeding
respondent "quickly becomes the 'victim' and feels besieged by a host of claimants perceived as
carrion seeking only to feast off his personal and professional misfortunes").
39. See ILL. COMP. STAT. ATT'Y REGISTRATION DISCIPLINARY COMM'N R. 53, 55 (allowing
the respondent o answer after given notice of the referral).
40. See id. R. 53 (mandating the respondent has fourteen days to respond to the prosecutor's
first requests for information).
41. See People ex rel. Brazen v. Finley, 519 N.E.2d 898, 902 (Ill. 1988) (explaining only the
Supreme Court of Illinois and the ARDC can discipline or sanction the unprofessional conduct of
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matter is more akin to that of a complainant who in all likelihood is not
impartial. Consequently, as you carefully review the referral, study what it
contains and search for what it is missing.
When I examined my referral, I discovered that it consisted solely of the
judge's own order in the underlying case that I was litigating before him.
The referral concerned what was said before and during my deposition of
a third-party witness and whether I concealed that deposition from the
court. And yet, the referral did not include the transcripts of the recording
of my interaction with the witness before I placed him under oath, the
ensuing deposition, the status hearing during which I discussed the
deposition with the court, or any of the motions in which I mentioned the
deposition.42 I also noticed that the judge's referral did not mention the
allegation that spawned the controversy: The third-party witness's
statement that his own lawyer and a state prosecutor threatened him with
lifetime detention if he testified in my client's favor.4 3
After you have collected all the relevant materials, it is time to prepare a
thorough defense. Needless to say, that presentation should not simply
consist of a stack of unexplained documents. No matter how strong the
supporting evidence, you must weave it into a coherent and persuasive
written argument. "It's sobering to think that bad [writing] can lose strong
cases. But this surely happens all the time."4 As any lawyer knows, no
legal argument is complete without supporting authority.4" Thankfully,
there is a lot of professional misconduct jurisprudence from which to
attorneys). Unlike most state courts, federal courts can decide matters of professional misconduct
and impose their own discipline in addition to referring the matter to the local bar authority. See
FEDERAL PROCEDURE, LAWYERS EDITION § 20:213 (2014) ("[When appropriate, a federal court
retains the power to impose discipline or refer questionable conduct for further investigation.'.
42. The court had all of these materials.
43. Such an attempt to deter witness testimony is a crime in Illinois, where I deposed the third-
party witness. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/32-4(b) (2013) ("A person who, with intent to deter any
party or witness from testifying freely, fully and truthfully to any matter pending in any court, or
before a Grand Jury, Administrative agency or any other State or local governmental unit, forcibly
detains such party or witness, or communicates, directly or indirectly, to such party or witness any
knowingly false information or a threat of injury or damage to the property or person of any
individual or offers or delivers or threatens to withhold money or another thing of value to any
individual commits a Class 3 felony.").
44. BRYAN A. GARNER, THE WINNING BRIEF: 100 TIPS FOR PERSUASIVE BRIEFING IN TRIAL
AND APPELLATE COURTS, at xvi (3d ed. 2014) (1999).
45. See THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 1, at 57 (Columbia Law
Review Ass'n et al. eds., 20th ed. 2015) ("Provide citations to authorities . . . .'); Kris Franklin, The
Rhetorics of LegalAuthoity Constructng Authoritativeness, the "Ellen Effect," and the Exanple of Sodomy Law,
33 RUTGERS L.J. 49, 52 (2001) ("[Llegal arguments are constructed on a foundation of supporting
authorities, and, like any construction, they can fail if their foundation is not secure." (alteration in
original)).
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draw. States' rules of professional conduct are annotated, most state bar
authority decisions are available for review, numerous federal and state
court decisions address nearly every conceivable question of professional
misconduct, and the secondary sources (law reviews, treatises, and
professional publications) are filled with useful analysis.
When your defense is ready, take the counter-intuitive step of inviting
the bar authority prosecutor assigned to your case to meet with you. The
purpose of this meeting is to personally deliver your written presentation
to the prosecutor and begin what will hopefully be the first of several
discussions. A proactive approach of this kind has its benefits."6
Professional misconduct referrals ultimately concern an attorney's
character and fitness to practice law." There is no better way to impress
those qualifications on the prosecutor than through face-to-face
interaction." Reaching out to the prosecutor also signals that you are
taking your situation seriously and being cooperative.4" Bar authorities
appreciate such behavior.so Moreover, getting your side of the "story" to
the prosecutor early on reduces the amount of time he has to think about
your case with only the referring judge's views shaping his impressions.
46. "Opening up" to bar authority prosecutors and inviting their inquiry can be a risky overture
that should not be undertaken without careful consideration. The merits of a respondent's defense,
the respondent's ability to effectively communicate those merits, and the prosecutor's reputation are
some of the factors that should inform the wisdom of engaging the prosecutor beyond what is
minimally required. Sometimes such engagement may not be advisable.
47. See In r Howard, 673 A.2d 800, 802 (N.J. 1996) ("The principal reason for discipline is to
preserve the confidence of the public in the integrity and trustworthiness of lawyers in general ....
Any misconduct, whether professional or private, that reveals a lack of good character essential for
an attorney constitutes a basis for discipline." (internal quotations and citations omitted)).
48. Various theories have demonstrated that in-person communication is more revealing and
persuasive than other forms of communication. See Alice F. Stuhlmacher & Maryalice Citera, 1-losle
Behavior and Profit in Virtual Negotatidon: A Meta-Anasie, 20 J. BUS. & PSYCH. 69, 86 (2005) (concluding
meta-analytic results show "virtual negotiations [involve] more hostile behavior and lower profits
than face-to-face negotiations"); see also Bibb Latane, The Pychology of Social Impact, 36 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 343, 344-49 (1984) (stating face-to-face communication maximizes a person's ability
to influence another due to the high degree of immediacy that is not present in virtual media
communication (telephone, video, email, texting)); Rodney A. Wellens, Use of Psycbological Distancing
Model to Assess Diferences in Telecommunicaion Media, 5 TELECONFERENCING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA
347, 347-61 (1986) (mentioning in-person communication promotes feelings of psychological
closeness as compared to other forms of communication (e.g., computer mediated interactions)
promote a psychological distance associated with weaker interpersonal bonds and less cooperation).
49. See, e.g., In re Rothstein, IL Disp. Op. M.R. 26703, 2014 WL 2535073, at *2 (Ill. Sup. Ct.
May 16, 2014) (noting cooperation with the disciplinary process should be considered in mitigation).
50. Id.
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III. LISTEN ACTIVELY
Once the fruits of your preparation have drawn the prosecutor's
attention, show him you are listening carefully to his concerns and those of
the referring judge. "The need for listening is obvious, yet it is difficult to
listen well, especially under the stress of an ongoing negotiation."51 When
defending something as precious as your reputation against an accuser as
powerful as a judge, "you may be so busy thinking about what you are
going to say next, how you are going to respond to that last point or how
you are going to frame your next argument, that you forget to listen to
what the other side is saying now."" Equally important, you could fail to
show the other side that they have been heard and understood." That is
where active listening comes in.5 4
Active listening is a communication technique whereby the listener
demonstrates to the speaker-by, for example, paraphrasing or stating an
implication of what the speaker said-that he has heard and understood.5 5
When employed effectively, active listening demonstrates to the other side
that their views are appreciated and frees them up to hear and hopefully
accept your position."
People listen better if they feel that you have understood them. They tend
to think that those who understand them are intelligent and sympathetic
people whose own opinions may be worth listening to. So if you want the
other side to appreciate your interests, begin by demonstrating that you
appreciate theirs.s7
To listen actively, you must avoid the urge to immediately counter
everything the other side says.5 1 Instead, take the time to understand their
perceptions and show them that you are engaged in that effort.5  For
example, every so often, while conversing with the ARDC prosecutor
51. FISHER & URY, supra note 4, at 36.
52. Id.
53. See id. at 36-37 (explaining the importance of actively listening to increase understanding).
54. Id. ("[Active] listening enables you to understand their perceptions, feel their emotions, and
hear what they are trying to say. Active listening improves not only what you hear but also what they
say.").
55. See Jonathan R. Cohen, When People Are the Means: Negotiating adth Respect, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHics 739, 748-49 (2001) (distinguishing the definition of active listening).
56. See FISHER & URY, supra note 4, at 37 ("[The other party] will also feel the satisfaction of
being heard and understood [when using active listening].... [T]he cheapest concession you can
make to the other side is to let them know they have been heard.'.
57. Id. at 53 (alternation in original).
58. See id. at 36-37 (establishing active listening is allowing the other party to express their
perceptions without feeling interrupted or misunderstood).
59. Id. at 36 ("Listening enables you to understand their perceptions . . .
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assigned to my referral, I would say: "I think you have touched on a
legitimate problem and if I understand you correctly you are saying
that. . ." and "The judge makes several strong points and I hear that he is
concerned about. . ." or "Let me make sure I correctly understand your
valid comments ... ." Notice how each one of my encapsulations of the
other side's position included a comment on the strength of their case as
they saw it.
Active listening can be a difficult skill to master, especially for lawyers.
We are trained to be somewhat dismissive of our opponent's point of
view. But if you want to negotiate a positive outcome with the bar
authority prosecutor assigned to your referral, you should realize that
"[u]nderstanding is not agreeing. One can at the same time understand
perfectly and disagree completely with what the other side is saying."6o
You are more likely to impress the merits of your arguments on an
opponent after you have convinced them that you grasp their
arguments.61
Once you have made their case for them, then come back with the problems
you find in their proposal. If you can put their case better than they can, and
then refute it, you maximize the chance of initiating a constructive dialogue
on the merits and minimize the chance of their believing you have
misunderstood them.62
Misunderstandings can be fatal to your defense against a referral.
Unless you show the bar authority prosecutor that you understand her
concerns and those of the referring judge she may believe you have not
heard her or, worse still, that you refuse to pay attention and need to be
taught a lesson.
IV. SEPARATE THE PEOPLE FROM THE PROBLEM
More so than most professional challenges, a judge's referral for
professional misconduct is personal for all the principal players. Judges
routinely see lawyers engage in what they view as misbehavior. In nearly
all such instances, however, judges will find a way to deal with the situation
short of penning out a bar referral." On those rare occasions when
60. Id. at 37.
61. See id. at 37-38 (encouraging negotiators to discuss the other side's argument in terms
favorable to them before seeking to refuting their points with your own, reasoning that the other side
will be more likely to listen to your argument).
62. Id. at 38.
63. See Arthur F. Greenbaum, The Automatic Reporting of Lamyer Misconduct to Discidpinag
Authorities: Filkng the Reporting 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 437, 474 (2012) (noting judicial underreporting of
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judges do take the trouble to compose a referral, odds are they are driven
64by a level of personal frustration. The process can also be personal for
the bar authority prosecutor. Referrals from judges may draw increased
scrutiny and perhaps even political pressure. And as for the target of the
referral, I guarantee you: it is personal-vey personal. Should you ever
have your professionalism questioned by a judge, get ready for that
challenge to take its toll on nearly every aspect of your life.
Negotiation theory suggests that when faced with trying personal
challenges, it is wise to "separate the people from the problem."" This
starts with recognizing your own negative emotions and how they could
obstruct a defense beneficial to you. "Anger over a situation may lead you
to express anger toward some human being associated with it in your mind
[i.e. the referring judge or the bar authority prosecutor]. Egos tend to
become involved in substantive positions."6 6  As your perceptions grow
myopic, you may stop listening or communicating adequately, not just to
your own lawyer but to the prosecutor. So cabin whatever resentment you
harbor for the referring judge or for the bar authority prosecutor and deal
with the reality as they see it. "As useful as looking for objective reality can
be, it is ultimately the reality as each side sees it that constitutes the
problem."67 That fact also points the way to a solution.
When your emotions are held in check, you will be able to show the bar
authority prosecutor that you can put yourself in the referring judge's
shoes. This negotiation strategy does not just seem inconsistent with your
objective of attacking the judge's position; it is inconsistent-at least
psychologically. That is precisely why it works. "A well-known theory of
psychology, the theory of cognitive dissonance, holds that people dislike
inconsistency and will act to eliminate it."" By acknowledging the
legitimacy of the referring judge's concerns while also disagreeing with his
reasoning, you create cognitive dissonance for the bar authority
prosecutor. To reconcile that tension, the prosecutor will be tempted to
distance himself from the judge's problematic reasoning (provided you
attorney misconduct and discussing its possible causes); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Dana A. Remus,
Advocacy Revalued, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 751, 774 (2011) ("Lawyers rarely report each others'
misconduct. Judges are similarly reluctant to refer complaints to disciplinary authorities . . . .").
64. See Charles B. Plattsmier, Self Regulation and the Duty to Report Misconduct- Myth or Mainstay?,
2007 PROF. LAW. SYMPOSIUM ISSUES 41, 44 (explaining a "sense of frustration" is "often found as
the motivation that spurred the lawyer or the judge to report misconduct").
65. FISHER & URY, s.upra note 4, at 19.
66. Id. at 22.
67. Id. at 25.
68. Id at 56.
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have shown it to be problematic) and hopefully join you in solving the
problem. Do not worry that the dissonance will concede your defense.
Remember: showing the prosecutor that you understand the judge's
concerns is not the same as stating that you agree with his analysis.6 9
The judge who referred me did not believe I was surprised when a
third-party witness appeared without his lawyer at a deposition and
proceeded to volunteer that his lawyer and a state prosecutor threatened
him. The judge also found that I did not tell the court that I deposed the
witness about his allegation, that my deposition concerned a matter within
the scope of the witness's representation7 o and intruded on attorney-client
privilege, that I broke my promise to the witness's lawyer that I would not
depose his client, and that I had nothing to gain from the deposition
because the witness intimidation allegation was inadmissible hearsay.
Throughout my interactions with the ARDC prosecutor I tried to show
him I could stand in the judge's shoes by stressing that I understood and
shared the judge's concerns about candor to the court, the sanctity of
attorney-client relationships, the need to keep promises, and the dangers
of hearsay.
Separating the people from the problem also means that you should
speak as much as possible about yourself rather than the judge." The
judge's views are already sufficiently weighty and harmful to you.
Focusing on what the judge did, or blaming the judge, will draw further
attention to the weakest part of your defense-your powerful accuser. No
matter the reason for the judge's findings (animosity toward your firm,
contempt for your client, personal bias), "even if blaming is justified, it is
usually counterproductive."" If you accuse the judge of acting in a way
that the bar authority prosecutor thinks is unlikely, the prosecutor could
dismiss your arguments as spiteful and disrespectful. "Assessing blame
firmly entangles the people with the problem."" The better course is to
"describe a problem in terms of its impact on you." 7 4
69. See id at 37 (reiterating the respondent can understand the prosecutor's case but may still
disagree with what they are saying).
70. Model Rule of Professional Conduct 4.2 states: "In representing a client, a lawyer shall not
communicate about the subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be
represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or
is authorized to do so by law or court order." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 4.2 (AM. BAR
Ass'N 2013).
71. See FISHER & URY, supra note 4, at 38-39 (suggesting the most persuasive strategy is to talk
about yourself and the impact it has had on you).
72. Id. at 27.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 39.
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During my defense, I said things like: "I was surprised by the
deponent's witness intimidation accusation because I had never
confronted such a dramatic statement" rather than "The judge cannot
speculate about how I felt." "I told the court about the deposition during
our hearing because I felt confident that his Honor would want to stop
witness intimidation" instead of "The judge ignored the hearing
transcript." "I hope that if you examine my analysis of Model Rule 4.2
and attorney-client privilege law, you will see that I violated neither"
rather than "The judge does not understand the law." As negotiators
know, "a statement about how you feel is difficult to challenge. You
convey the same information without provoking a defensive reaction that
will prevent them from taking it in."" You want the bar authority
prosecutor to "take in" what you say.
By separating the people from the problem, you also lessen your burden
and your potential exposure. Negotiators refer to this as reducing the area
of conflict." Rather than having to persuade the bar authority prosecutor
that he should reject every single aspect of the referring judge's analysis,
you only have to carry that burden on a smaller number of disputed
material points. It is unnecessary to contest every conclusion in the
judge's referral. Some of those conclusions can and should go
unchallenged or even be admitted. In my case, I unequivocally admitted
that my decision to depose a witness outside the presence of his lawyer
was, as the judge found, unwise. In hindsight, I should have erred on the
side of caution and said nothing to the witness. Sometimes, taking the
"leave no stone unturned" approach can make you seem needlessly
contentious. If you ultimately fail to persuade the prosecutor to close the
judge's referral, each remaining point of contention between you and the
referring judge may support the imposition of discipline. Fewer points of
contention could mean a lesser penalty, or better yet, no penalty.
V. BE HARD ON THE PROBLEM
Part and parcel of separating the people from the problem is being hard
on the problem. "This is the place ... to spend your aggressive
energies."" Your objective is to persuade the bar authority prosecutor
that no discipline is warranted, and nothing should hold you back from
trying to secure that objective. Do not assume, for example, that the
75. Id.
76. Id. at 2 6 .
77. Id. at 55-56.
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prosecutor is inclined to side with the judge or, if he is so inclined, that
you cannot change his opinion. "People tend to assume that whatever
they fear, the other side intends to do."" When accused of wrongdoing
by a judge, it is easy to assume that all who hear about it will immediately
think the worst. After all, judges are supposed to issue well-reasoned
decisions that reflect their skilled examination of fact and law.7 9 But
remember, even a judge's referral for professional misconduct is just an
accusation. Courts do not generally decide questions of professional
misconduct."o Once the judge makes his referral, it is the bar authority
prosecutor's turn to examine it and try to prove the truth of those
allegations with clear and convincing evidence." Do not hamstring your
attack on the problem by deducing the prosecutor's intentions from your
fears.
As you attack the problem presented by the judge's referral, focus on
the bar authority prosecutor's interests. Interests are a. party's needs,
desires, and concerns." "Interests motivate people; they are the silent
movers behind the hubbub of positions. Your position is something you
have decided upon. Your interests are what caused you to so decide."83
We tend to assume that because another side is opposed to us, their
interests must also be opposed. If a judge made a referral, then the bar
authority must have an interest in upholding it. If the respondent has an
interest in defending himself, then the prosecutor must have an interest in
disciplining him. In a professional misconduct case, however, the bar
authority prosecutor will rely on the relevant professional responsibility
law to decide whether to push the referral toward discipline or seek to
close it out. This fact can be tremendously advantageous to your defense
because it concentrates you and the prosecutor on the objective criteria of
the relevant law. "It is far easier to deal with people when both of you are
discussing objective standards for settling a problem instead of trying to
78. Id. at 26.
79. Arrie W. Davis, The Richness of Eperience, Empathy, and the Role of a Judge: The Senate
Confirmation Hearings For judge Sonia Sotomayor, 40 U. BALT. L.F. 1, 36 ("A judge ... functions
essentially within the framework of an 'umpire,' fastidiously examining the law and applying the
relevant law to the facts before the judge in order to arrive at just, well-reasoned and well-supported
decisions.").
80. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
81. See, e.g., ILCS S. CT. R. 753(c)(6) (2010) (stating the standard of proof is clear and
convincing evidence for disciplinary hearings).
82. See FISHER & URY, supra note 4 at 42 (suggesting each side's conflicting position stems
from their own "needs, desires, concerns and fears").
83. Id. at 43.
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force each other to back down."8 4  Moreover, as the socially and
politically weaker party (compared to the referring judge), you want to
"[c]oncentrate on the merits of the problem, not the mettle of the
parties."8 5  Given that you must establish the legitimacy of your interests
to impress them on the other side, showing the bar authority prosecutor
you understand your legal and obligations is the key to persuading him in
your favor.
In my case, I presented the bar authority prosecutor with a detailed
argument that tied my unique factual circumstances to the relevant
professional responsibility law. "Concrete details not only make your
description credible, they add impact."8 6 In response to each of the
referring judge's allegations, I presented evidence of the following while
stressing my understanding of why someone might disagree with my
analysis:
I was surprised when the third party witness arrived for his deposition.
Beforehand, the witness's lawyer told me that his client had "no relevant or
material information" to offer me, the lawyer moved to quash my
deposition, we agreed that I would not depose his client, and I instructed my
client to inform detention facility authorities that the witness will not be
deposed.
I did not conceal my deposition of the third party witness from the court. I
gave the court the transcripts of my recorded conversation with the witness
before I deposed him. Regarding the deposition itself, I stated in several
motions that I deposed the witness, and I discussed the deposition with the
judge during a status hearing.
I did not violate Model Rule 4.287 by communicating with the third party
witness about his allegation that his lawyer and the state prosecutor
threatened him with lifetime detention if he testified in my client's favor.
Under the crime-fraud exception, that allegation was outside the scope of
the witness's representation by the lawyer who threatened him.8 8
84. Id. at 84.
8 5. Id.
86. Id. at 52.
87. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 4.2 (AM. BAR ASs'N 2013) (declaring an
attorney cannot speak to a represented client unless authorized to do so).
88. See Haines v. Liggett Grp., 975 F.2d 81, 90 (3rd Cir. 1992) (stating the crime-fraud
exception applies "to assure that he 'seal of secrecy' between lawyer and client does not extend to
communications from the lanyer to the client made by the lawyer for the purpose of giving advice for
the commission of a fraud or crime" (alteration in original)); see also In re Decker, 606 N.E.2d 1094,
1101 (Ill. 1992) (noting the crime-fraud exception "applies when a client seeks or obtains the services
of an attorney in furtherance of criminal or fraudulent activity"). The premise of the exception is
that when legal advice is given to further a crime, the communication is not made by an attorney
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I did not violate attorney-client privilege by deposing the third party witness
about his allegation of witness intimidation. The alleged threat was illegal
conduct not covered by attorney-client privilege. 8 9 Even if it was covered,
the witness waived the privilege by volunteering his allegation.90
I did not break my promise to the third party witness's counsel not to
depose his client. I could not have promised the lawyer that I would refrain
from exploring his client's allegation against him because I did not know
about that allegation until the witness volunteered it. At that moment,
failing to explore the allegation would have violated my duty to my client.9 1
Such a failure would have also violated the interests of justice.9 2
A witness's allegation of intimidation is not hearsay because threats are
"verbal acts," not assertions, admissible as circumstantial evidence of
another purpose (e.g. criminal behavior and lack of credibility). 9
Focusing your discussion with the bar authority prosecutor on how the
relevant law should guide his decision rather than on what the referring
judge wants will not guarantee your success. It will, however, offer a way
"within the just scope of the relation between legal adviser and client." 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2298, at 572 (John McNaughton rev., 8th ed. 1961)
(1904).
89. See United States v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 492 F.3d 806, 818 (7th Cir. 2007) ("The crime-
fraud exception places communications made in furtherance of a crime or fraud outside the
attorney-client privilege.'); see also In re Decker, 606 N.E.2d at 1101 ("[Where the crime-fraud
exception applies, no attorney-client privilege exists whatsoever, and the communication is not
privileged.'.
90. See Appleton Papers, Inc. v. EPA, 702 F.3d 1018, 1024 (7th Cir. 2012) ("[A] party that
voluntarily discloses part of a conversation covered by the attorney-client privilege waives the
privilege as to the portion disclosed and to all other communications relating to the same subject
matter.'; Ctr. Partners v. Growth Head GP, 2012 IL 113107, ¶ 35 ("[The attorney-client privilege
may be waived by the client when the client voluntarily testifies to the privileged matter.").
91. See MODEL RULES r. 1.3 ("A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing a client.").
92. United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1355 (8th Cir. 1976) (explaining to exclude the
statements of a witness who refused to testify because of intimidation "would be antithetical to the
truth-seeking function of our judicial system and would not serve the interests of justice"). "To allow
witness intimidation to prevent in-court testimony would violate any reasonable notion of the
interests of justice." David A. Sonenshein, The Residual Exceptions to the Federal Hearsay Rule: Two
Exceptions in Search ofa Rule, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 867, 900 (1982) (discussing Carlson, 547 F.2d at 1346).
93. People v. Klisnick, 390 N.E.2d 1330, 1337-38 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 1979) (rejecting hearsay
argument and affirming admission of testimony about a threat as evidence of criminal behavior); see
also Tompkins v. Cyr, 202 F.3d 770, 779 (5th Cir. 2000) (affirming admission of testimony about
threats because they were verbal acts and not hearsay); United States v. Bellomo, 176 F.3d 580, 586
(2d Cir. 1999) (explaining statements offered as evidence of commands or threats directed to the
witness are not hearsay); United States v. Thomas, 86 F.3d 647, 654 n.12 (7th Cir. 1996) (explaining
threats were not hearsay when "not admitted to prove the truth of the words asserted, but rather
were admitted as 'verbal acts' that potentially affected the credibility of witnesses").
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for you to vigorously attack the problem-i.e. the merits of the referring
judge's conclusions-without incurring the high costs of attacking the
judge. I never offered my view of why the judge reached conclusions that
were belied by record transcripts, motion content, and well-settled
authority. Had I answered those questions, I would have moved from
being hard on the problem to being hard on the people, and maybe even
risked sounding paranoid. If your interest-based arguments raise any
delicate "why" questions, trust that the bar authority prosecutor will be
savvy enough to answer them on his own.
VI. CONCLUSION
Perhaps the most difficult part of facing a judicial referral for
professional misconduct is realizing that all hope is not lost. Despite
support and encouragement from many, I still grappled with self-doubt,
despair, and many sleepless nights. When it came time to deal with the bar
authority prosecutor, I fell back on my negotiation-theory training more
out of instinct than by conscious choice. Had I known then that someone
has a strategy to successfully close out a judicial referral, my ordeal may
have been less taxing. This Essay aims to offer those who will someday
walk a mile in my shoes that measure of relief. Although the proper
implementation of the problem-solving strategies offered by negotiation
theory cannot guarantee any respondent the best possible outcome, it can
at least increase the chances of its realization.
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